This appendix contains a number of additional tests, robustness checks, and summary statistics for Sell Side School Ties. We organize by the accompanying tables and figures. Thus each subsequent section corresponds to a table (or figure) in the appendix.
I. Table A1 -Summary Statistics on Links Table A1 presents the percentage of linked stocks, the number of linked stocks, and the number of stocks covered for different categories of analysts. Note that we classify an analyst-stock pair as "linked" if an analyst attended at least one common school with at least one senior manager (or board member), and "unlinked" if an analyst did not attend a single common school with any senior manager (or board member). Also note that we require education data on at least one senior manager in order to define a valid analyst-stock link or non-link.
1 Analysts, as a whole, are linked to an average of 18% of the stocks they cover; since the average analyst covers 6.2 stocks, this translates to just over 1 linked stock on average per analyst. Analysts who attended a school in the top 10 in terms of the number of links to firms are tied to an average of 35% of the stocks they cover, or roughly 2 stocks on average. Similarly, analysts who attended any university ranked in the top 40 by US News and World Report in the prior year have ties to 28% of the firms they cover. Meanwhile analysts from Ivy League schools are actually linked to slightly fewer stocks than the average analyst. Finally, there are no significant differences across any of the sub-categories in the percentage of linked stocks Pre-and Post-Regulation FD, suggesting that the population of analysts is unlikely to have changed over time in a way that is correlated with school ties. Table A3 provides summary statistics on the UK sample of firms and analysts used in Table VII. The table mimics the setup of Table I in the paper, which provides these same statistics for the main US sample.
IV. Table A4 -School Links and All-Star
Another way to quantify the value of the social networks we isolate in this paper is to test the extent to which school ties predict the probability of that analyst's becoming an All-Star. As in our prior tests, All-Star status is defined as being listed as an "All-Star" in the October issue of Institutional Investor magazine in a given year. AllStar status is a sought-after designation among analysts, and is typically associated with higher-compensation (Stickel (1992) ).
3
To assess the predictive power of an analyst's network, we regress a dummy variable for All-Star status in a given year on the average number of school ties per analyst per year (Num Link) plus a host of control variables at 2 See Table A2 , for additional specifications using abnormal returns, upgrades, etc. These results are very similar to those described here.
3 Stickel (1992) shows that All-Star analysts also produce more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts, suggesting a link between reputation and performance. Interestingly, in unreported tests we find that the All-Star analysts in our sample do not outperform other analysts on their buy/sell recommendations; this result is consistent with prior evidence (see Groysberg et al. (2008) , footnote 27) that finds no relation between All-Star status and stock returns, except at very short windows surrounding recommendation changes.
the analyst-and stock-level. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the analyst was voted as an All-Star analyst for that year. We employ a similar set of control variables as in Table IV , with the exception that affiliation status is now measured as the average percentage of stocks (over the year) in an analyst's portfolio that have an underwriting relationship with the analyst's brokerage. We also include a control variable for covered firm size, equal to the average size of the firms covered by the analyst in that year. All observations are at the analyst-year level; fixed effects at the year, analyst, and broker level are included where indicated, and all standard errors are adjusted for clustering by year. We run these regressions using both an OLS and a probit framework. We report both in Table A4 . Table A4 reports the coefficient estimates from these predictive regressions.
Columns 1-8 are OLS panel regressions, while Column 9 is a probit regression with random effects (given the known statistical problems associated with fixed effects in nonlinear panel data estimation models (Greene (2003)
)). The coefficients on Linked to
Mgmt indicate that the number of school ties is a strong positive predictor of the likelihood of being an All-Star. The coefficient on connections in Column 1 implies that a one standard deviation increase in connections increases the probability of being an AllStar by nearly 50%, from 9.2% to 13.6%. Columns 3-5 show that analysts who attended Ivy League schools or the most linked schools in our sample are more likely to be All Star analysts. These school-specific effects, though, have almost no impact on the magnitude or significance of the effect of the specific links of analysts to the management of firms that they cover. Columns 7-9 illustrate the effect of Reg FD on this result: we include a post-Reg FD dummy variable plus an interaction term (Link Mgmt*post-Reg to zero and insignificant, indicating that school ties have no effect on being an All-Star in the post-Reg FD period. The fact that school ties predict All-Star status only before the imposition of Reg FD further highlights the value of social networks precisely during those times when selective disclosure is least inhibited. Table A7 , and are plotted in Figure A1 . These event-time returns are consistent with the findings from our earlier calendar time portfolio tests. Over the full sample period, upgrades by analysts with school ties earn a premium of 35 basis points over other upgrades in the 2 days around the event, and a premium of almost 400 basis points over the calendar year after the recommendation change. 5 Figure A1 shows that much of the upgrade return premium associated with school ties is concentrated between 60 and 250 days after the recommendation, suggesting that whatever information these linked analysts obtain does not get revealed into prices until several months after the recommendation change.
We also calculate these event-time returns (CARs) separately for the pre-Reg FD Figure A2 shows that the school-tie premium increases to over 700 basis points over the calendar year after recommendation changes, while in the postReg FD period, Figure A3 shows that the school tie premium decreases to less than 150 basis points.
VIII. Table A8 -Clustering by Analyst Table A8 replicates Table IV in the paper, but adjusting standard errors for 5 See Table A7 for event-time return decompositions over various horizons.
clustering at the analyst (as opposed to the recommendation month) level. Standard error estimates are quite close to those in Table IV , and significance levels of school ties are identical across all specifications.
IX. Table A9 -Restricted Sample and DGTW-Adjusted Returns Table A9 contains regression specifications of Tables IV and V in the paper, for returns following buy and sell recommendations. The two differences are that: i.) we do the analysis on a restricted sample for which we are able to definitively identify all potential links from the analyst to senior managers (i.e., where we have school information for the analyst, and all three senior managers), and ii.) we do the analysis for DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns. As seen in the table, we obtain very similar results, in terms of both magnitude and significance, to Tables IV and V. X. Figure This table shows the distribution of linked stocks across analysts, where a "linked stock" is defined as a stock that the analyst covers with whom the analyst shares an educational link with the senior management (or board of directors). The table reports the number of linked stocks, the percentage of linked stocks (as a% of total stocks covered by an analyst), and the number of stocks covered, for the entire analyst sample ("All") and for different categories of analysts. The categories are as follows: "Top 10" refers to analysts who attended a school with the highest number of links to senior management (or the board of directors) in our sample; "Bottom 10" refers to analysts who attended schools with the lowest number of links; "Ivy League" refers to analysts who attended a school in the Ivy League; and Non-Ivy refers to analysts who did not attend a school in the Ivy League.; US News Top 40 indicates if an analyst attended a school ranked in the Top 40 National Universities in US News and World Report. "Pre Reg-FD" refers to all recommendations made before Regulation FD came into effect (Oct 23, 2000) , and "Post Reg-FD" refers to all those made after the law came into effect. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution as a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, or initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a buy (IBES code = 2) or strong buy (IBES code = 1) rating, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, initiated, resumed or reiterated coverage with a hold (IBES code =3), sell (IBES code = 4) or strong sell (IBES code = 5) rating or dropped from coverage. If the brokerage house does not report the stock as dropped from coverage and a recommendation is not revised or reiterated within twelve months it is considered expired. We skip a trading day between recommendation and investment (disinvestment). For the BUY portfolio each recommended stock is held until it is either downgraded, dropped from coverage, or the recommendation expires. We compute value weighted portfolios by averaging across analysts, weighting individual recommendations by the IBES recommendation code; for the BUY portfolio, we reverse these recommendation codes so that a strong buy is set to 5 and a strong sell is set to 1. The SELL portfolio is constructed in a similar fashion with the exception that that the original IBES recommendation codes (i.e., strong sell=5, and strong buy=1) are used as portfolio weight. We report average returns and DGTW-adjusted returns for the period 1993 to 2006. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industryadjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in monthly percent. L/S is average return of a zero cost portfolio that holds the portfolio of linked stocks and sells short the portfolio of non-linked stocks. Pre-and Post REG FD indicates returns for recommendations issued prior and subsequent to the introduction of Regulation FD on October 23, 2000. t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. (2000), and 0 for all years before.
Link Mgmt*Post Reg-FD is the interaction term between Linked to Mgmt and Post Reg-FD. Covered Firm Size is the average size of firm covered by the given analyst in the given year. Analyst Experience is equal to the number of years the analyst has been making recommendations recorded in I/B/E/S. Affiliation is the average percentage of stocks in an analyst's portfolio that have an underwriting relationship with the analyst's brokerage. Brokerage Size is the total number of analysts that work at the given analyst's brokerage house.
Fixed effects at the year (Year), analyst (Analyst), and brokerage house (Broker) level are included where indicated. Columns 1-8 are OLS panel regressions, while Column 9 is a probit regression run with random effects. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering by year, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) This table shows event time cumulative abnormal returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution as a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting to all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation. We report event-time average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Abnormal returns are defined as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns: daily returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in percent, standard errors are clustered by calendar date, and t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. News and World Report. Size is the market capitalization of the firm, BM is the book-to-market ratio of the firm, and Past Returns is the past one-year stock return of the firm. Analyst Experience is equal to the number of years the analyst has been making recommendations recorded in I/B/E/S. Affiliation is a categorical variable that measures whether or not the given firm has an underwriting relationship with the analyst's brokerage. All Star is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the investor was voted an all star analyst in the October issue of Institutional Investor magazine for the given year. Brokerage Size is the total number of analysts that work at the given analyst's brokerage house. Fixed effects for month (Month), analyst (Analyst), and industry (Indus) using the Fama-French industry definitions, are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the analyst level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) or not the analyst is linked in an education network to the given firm on which she is making a recommendation.
Size is the market capitalization of the firm, BM is the book-to-market ratio of the firm, and Past Returns is the past one-year stock return of the firm. Analyst Experience is equal to the number of years the analyst has been making recommendations recorded in I/B/E/S. Affiliation is a categorical variable that measures whether or not the given firm has an underwriting relationship with the analyst's brokerage. All Star is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the investor was voted an all star analyst in the October issue of Institutional Investor magazine for the given year. Brokerage Size is the total number of analysts that work at the given analyst's brokerage house.
Fixed effects for month (Month), analyst (Analyst), and industry (Indus) using the Fama-French industry definitions, are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the analyst level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Figure A1 : Returns to School Ties, Event-time returns, 1993 Event-time returns, -2006 This figure shows event time cumulative abnormal returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution of a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation. We report event-time average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Abnormal returns are defined as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns: daily returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in percent. Figure A2 : Returns to School Ties, Event-time returns, pre-Reg. FD This figure shows event time cumulative abnormal returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution of a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation. We report event-time average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Abnormal returns are defined as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns: daily returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in percent. Figure A3 : Returns to School Ties, Event-time returns, post-Reg. FD This figure shows event time cumulative abnormal returns. We classify a stock as having an educational tie to the analyst if he/she attended the same institution of a senior officer (CEO, CFO or Chairman) or a board member. Each recommendation is assigned to one of two portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio consisting of all stocks upgraded with respect to the previous recommendation, and (2) a SELL portfolio, consisting of all stocks downgraded with respect to the previous recommendation. We report event-time average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Abnormal returns are defined as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns: daily returns minus the returns on a value weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Returns are in percent. 
